

4. After arriving at the King Soopers, Mr. Alissa shot and killed ten people, including a Boulder police officer. Witnesses heard very few statements from Mr. Alissa. Statements believed to have been made by Mr. Alissa were described as “gibberish.”
5. Mr. Alissa was shot in the leg by law enforcement prior to surrendering. Law enforcement placed Mr. Alissa under arrest and transported him to the hospital.
6. On March 23, 2024 law enforcement applied for a received a search warrant for Mr. Alissa’s residence in Arvada. In addition to searching that residence law enforcement spoke to a number of Mr. Alissa’s family members. Mr. Alissa’s family members were in shock and disbelief with what Mr. Alissa did that day. They would describe Mr. Alissa as someone who was quiet and non-violent. Someone who irrationally believed he was being followed by the FBI and would talk to himself in a way that was like he was talking to someone who wasn’t there.
7. In addition to learning more about Mr. Alissa and his mental illness, law enforcement also learned that his phone number was 720-999-4482 and it was associated with a T-Mobile account.
8. On March 23, 2021 Investigator Weisbach submitted a search warrant request. *See Exhibit A.* Investigator Weisbach only limited the search of these records to a time period from January 15, 2021 to March 22, 2021. She requested all documents, files and media to be in the possession of T-Mobile.
9. Honorable Judge Mulvahill signed the warrant that same day. *See id.*

LAW AND ARGUMENT

10. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art II, Sec. 7, of the Colorado Constitution “provides protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.” *People v. Williams*, 192 Colo. 249, 253 (Colo. 1976).
11. The United States Constitution states in pertinent part, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause...” U.S. Const. Amend IV.
12. “The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Information that a person “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” *Id.*
13. “As in the case of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution...the purpose of the Colorado constitutional provision is to protect a person's legitimate expectation of privacy from unreasonable governmental intrusions.” *People v. Sporleder*, 666 P.2d 135, 139-40 (Colo. 1983); *Charnes v. DiGiacomo*, 612 P.2d 1117 (1980); *People v. Bement*, 567 P.2d 382 (1977); *People v. Counterman*, 556 P.2d 481 (Colo. 1973).
14. The determination of the legitimacy of a defendant’s expectation of privacy turns on the

question of whether a person expected that their property would be free from governmental intrusion, and if so, whether that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” *Sporleder*, 666 P.2d at 140.

15. Mr. Alissa’s T-Mobile account and data is constitutionally protected account and information. This information is password and/or pin protected and not accessible by the public: the Fourth Amendment protects all individuals from intrusions upon their private electronic conversations. *See Katz*, *supra*.
16. “Any governmental action intruding upon an activity or area in which one holds such an expectation of privacy is a “search” that calls into play the protections of the Colorado Constitution.” *People v. Oates*, 698 P.2d 811 (Colo. 1988).
17. Generally, the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment has three basic requirements that must be met in order for a warrant to issue: “[1] probable cause, [2] supported by Oath or affirmation, and [3] particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” *Whiteley v. Warden*, 401 U.S. 560, 564 (1971); U.S. Const. amend. IV.
18. The Colorado Constitution, state statutes, and rules governing the issuance of search warrants provide additional requirements for a search warrant. *See* Colo. Const. art. II §§ 7, 8; *see also* C.R.S. §§ 16-3-301 to 16-3-308; Crim. P. 41.
19. Section 16-3-303(1) provides in relevant part: “a search warrant shall issue only on affidavit sworn to or affirmed before the judge and relating facts sufficient to: . . . (c) establish the grounds for issuance of the warrant or probable cause to believe that such grounds exist; and (d) establish probable cause to believe that the property to be searched for, seized, or inspected is located at, in, or upon the premises, person, place, or thing to be searched.”
20. The affidavit must therefore supply a sufficient nexus between criminal activity, the things to be seized, and the place to be searched. *People v. Kazmierski*, 25 P.3d 1207, 1211 (Colo. 2001); *People v. Randolph*, 4 P.3d 477 (Colo. 2000).
21. The warrant lacked the particularity required by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and therefore any fruits of the search must be suppressed. In this case, the warrant describes a broad, generalized list of information to be searched for which could arguably include almost anything within the records. Here, the warrant was not specific enough to meet the particularity requirements of the U.S. and Colorado Constitutions or C.R.C.P. 41(d)(I)(1). The particularity requirements ensures that a search is confined in scope to particularly-described evidence relating to a specific crime for which there is demonstrated probable cause. *United States v. Leahy*, 47 F.3d 396, 398 (10th Cir. 1996); *Anderson v. Maryland*, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). Requesting all any documents, files or media currently in possession of T-Mobile for Mr. Alissa does not meet the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

WHEREFORE, Mr. Alissa requests this Court suppress all evidence obtained through

the defective search warrant for T-Mobile records associated with the phone number 720-999-4482. Mr. Alissa makes these arguments and motions, and all motions and objections in this case, whether or not expressly stated at the time of the motion or objection, under the Due Process, Trial by Jury, Right to Counsel, Confrontation, Compulsory Process, Equal Protection Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Privilege Against Self Incrimination Clauses of the federal and Colorado Constitutions, and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and Art. II, §§ 3,6,7,8,16,18,20,23 and 25 of Colorado's Constitution.

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Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on ___April
26_____, 2024, I served the foregoing
document through Colorado E filing to all
opposing counsel of record.

KH

Dated: April 23, 2024